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policies. Recent literature argues that government spending may be very effective in such 
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deficit financing and tax reductions. This paper explores the role of government debt and 
deficits in an economy constrained by the zero bound on nominal interest rates. Given that 
the liquidity trap is generated by a large increase in the desire to save on the part of the 
private  sector,  the  wealth  effects  of  government  deficits  can  provide  a  critical 
macroeconomic response to this. Government spending financed by deficits may be far 
more expansionary than that financed by tax increases in such an environment. In a liquidity 
trap, tax cuts may be much more effective than during normal times. Finally, monetary 
policies aimed at directly increasing monetary aggregates may be effective, even if interest 
rates are unchanged. 
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System. 1 Introduction
The dramatic policy response to the 2008-2009 global economic crisis followed by many coun-
tries has revived some old debates about the use of ￿scal and monetary policy in ￿ghting
recessions. The central dilemma for policy-makers in Japan, North America and Europe
has been to try to counter a large recession brought on by an unprecedented fall in private
consumption and investment spending, but at the same time being constrained by the in-
ability to lower nominal interest rates below their current near-zero level. The end-result
was an ad hoc series of ￿scal and monetary measures - de￿cit ￿nanced government spending
increases, tax cuts, and ￿ unconventional￿monetary policy measures such as open market
purchases on long-dated securities, direct increases in the monetary base, etc. Coming
under the catch-all term of ￿ stimulus-packages￿ , the design of these policies did not come
from theoretical frameworks or quantitative macro-economic models of the style that have
been explored within central banks for the last decade, but rather produced from ￿ back of
the envelope￿style arguments about the size of ￿scal multipliers and the impact of liquidity
injections on credit ￿ ows.
At the same time, there has been a vigorous debate within the economics profession
about the usefulness of ￿scal and monetary stimulus at all1. One fact that has been less
well recognized perhaps is that the central dilemma about the options for economic policy
in a liquidity trap has been extensively studied within the recent vintage of New Keynesian
DSGE models in light of the 1990￿ s experience of Japan. In particular, Krugman (1998),
Eggertston and Woodford (2003,2005), Jung et al. (2005), Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005)
and many other writers explored how monetary and ￿scal policy could be usefully employed
even when the authorities have no further room to reduce short term nominal interest rates.
Recently, a number of authors have revived this literature in light of the very similar problems
now encountered by the economies of Western Europe and North America. Papers by
Christiano et al (2009), Eggertson (2009), Cogan et al. (2008) have explored the possibility
for using government spending expansions, tax cuts, and monetary policy when the economy
is in a ￿ liquidity trap￿ .
One key aspect of the e⁄ects of ￿scal and monetary policy in a liquidity trap that seems to
have so far gone relatively unexplored is the role that government de￿cits and debt issue plays
as part of a stimulus package. On the one hand, there has been overwhelming agreement
among policy practioners that in order to be useful, ￿scal stimulus must be ￿nanced with
debt rather than compensating tax increases, and also that part of the stimulus could be
1See for instance Krugman (2009), and the response by Cochrane (2009).
2based on tax cuts rather than spending increases. But in most of the existing classes of
New Keynesian DSGE models that examine ￿scal and monetary policies in a liquidity trap,
the distinction between tax ￿nanced and debt ￿nanced ￿scal stimulus is irrelevant (and
tax cuts that leave the present value of taxation unchanged are also irrelevant), because
these models are characterized by Ricardian equivalence, with in￿nitely lived consumers and
in￿nite planning horizons.
It would seem then that in order to o⁄er a serious analysis of the role of ￿scal stimulus
in a liquidity trap, it is necessary to depart from the benchmark assumption of the in￿nitely
lived Ramsey consumer. This paper takes a ￿rst step in this direction. Following a number
of recent papers (e.g. Annichiarrico et al 2008), we amend the basic New Keynesian sticky
price model of Woodford (2003) and Clarida Gali and Gertler (1999) by incorporating ￿-
nite planning horizons in the manner of Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965). This means
that government spending ￿nanced by debt has di⁄erent e⁄ects than that ￿nanced by tax
increases, that government debt itself has wealth e⁄ects for currently-alive households, that
pure lump-sum tax cuts may be expansionary, and moreover, that monetary policy aimed
at increasing the outstanding stock of monetary aggregates may have direct ￿ real balance￿
e⁄ects independently of its e⁄ect (or non-e⁄ect) on nominal interest rates.
We explore the impacts of ￿scal and monetary policy in this model, and contrast the
results with the recent literature on policy in a liquidity trap. We focus on a scenario where
a large increase in the desire to save on the part of households pushes down the economy￿ s
underlying real interest rate, and in an economy with sticky prices, causes a fall in aggregate
demand output and in￿ ation.
Our central results may be summarised brie￿ y. We ￿nd that in an environment where
monetary policy rules work ￿ normally￿ , adjusting interest rates in response to in￿ ation and
output ￿ gaps￿ , the introduction of ￿nite planning horizons has little to o⁄er with respect to
the analysis of the impacts of ￿scal policy and monetary policy shocks. When the model
is calibrated to introduce empirically realistic planning horizons, there is little quantitative
impact of the deviation from Ricardian equivalence. In our benchmark model, for instance,
the ￿ balanced budget￿government spending multiplier is unity, and the multiplier implied
by purely de￿cit ￿nanced government spending is only slightly larger.
By contrast, when policy is constrained by ￿ a liquidity trap￿ , there may be a dramatic
di⁄erence between the response of the economy with an e⁄ectively in￿nite planning horizon
and that with ￿nite horizon. Equivalently, the impact of de￿cit ￿nancing of ￿scal policies may
be much greater than policies ￿nanced by taxes. In our benchmark model, the balanced
budget government spending multiplier is also unity, even in a liquidity trap. But the
3multiplier for a de￿cit ￿nanced government spending expansion is over 2. Intuitively, the
model predicts that government debt issue has substantial wealth e⁄ects in a liquidity trap.
These wealth e⁄ects stimulate aggregate demand and private consumption, and play an
expansionary macroeconomic role, aside from the direct e⁄ects of government spending.
Another perspective is as follows. In an economy with Ricardian equivalence and no
capital, a large increase in the desire to save cannot be satis￿ed in equilibrium. In a ￿ exible
price world, we would simply see a fall in real interest rates. In a liquidity trap, where
prices are sticky, the adjustment has to take place through a large fall in current output and
consumption (see Christiano et al (2009) for an explication of this argument). But in a world
with ￿nite horizon consumers, government debt issue in e⁄ect provides a vehicle for saving
on the part of the private sector. This satis￿es part of their increase in the desire to save,
and as a result, places a limit on the degree to which aggregate demand and consumption
has to fall. E⁄ectively, our results suggest that this macroeconomic role of government debt
issue can play an important part in a ￿scal stimulus package during a liquidity trap.
We also show that the role of government debt issue is essentially equivalent, in our
model, to the utilization of the ￿ real balance￿e⁄ect in monetary expansion. As a corollary
then, the model implies that this real balance e⁄ect may be negligible in normal times, but
play a non-trivial role during a liquidity trap. Again, however, a key requirement for it to
work is that Ricardian equivalence fails.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section brie￿ y discusses the nature of ￿scal
and monetary policy responses to the recent crisis. The next section develops the basic
model to be used throughout the paper. Section 4 discusses the nature of the steady state
in the model. Section 5 and 6 outline the impact of government spending, tax, and debt
shocks in the model when the economy is both outside and within a liquidity trap, both
qualitatively and quantitatively.
2 Fiscal and Monetary Responses to the Crisis
2.1 The limits to monetary policy
Following the collapse in economic activity across global economies in late 2008, monetary
authorities in almost all countries reduced interest rates dramatically. But by mid 2009,
for most central banks, policy rates were close to their minimum feasible levels. Figure 1
describes the path of policy rates from mid 2008 in 5 major economies. The US, the UK,
Canada, and the ECB all reduced rates in September 2008. By the end of the year, the US
4Federal Funds rate was near zero. By mid 2009, the other three economies had rates at or
below 1 percent. Japan of course, already had a policy rate below 1 percent, but reduced it
further in early 2009.
Reaching the limit of monetary policy traction through the interest rate channel, central
banks engaged in a range of ￿ unconventional￿monetary policy strategies. The US Federal
Reserve for instance, promising to "employ all available tools to promote economic recovery
and to preserve price stability" , began in late 2008 to widen the range of counter-parties
it would lend to, and accept a broader form collateral form of collateral, based on the
assumption that the normal links between interest rates and credit expansion were failing to
operate during the crisis. Later, the Fed directly intervened in long term securities markets,
and by mid 2009 had more than doubled the size of its balance sheet (Rudebusch, 2009)
Similarly, in March 2009, the Bank of England began a policy of ￿ Quantitative Easing￿ ,
involving purchase of various government and corporate bonds2. The ECB has taken a
range of similar measures.
There is considerable scepticism about the e⁄ectiveness of this unconventional monetary
policy however. Evidence from Japan in the late 1990￿ s provides little support that in-
creasing available liquidity can stimulate credit ￿ ows to consumers and ￿rms and stimulate
activity, holding the interest rate constant. Similarly, recent studies in the US suggest that
quantitative easing would have to be much larger than even the recent Fed balance sheet
expansions in order to be e⁄ective (Krugman 2009).
A ￿nal channel of monetary policy is through communications and the targeting of ex-
pectations. Even if interest rates remain at zero for some considerable period, the monetary
authority can in￿ uence current conditions by announcing its intention to maintain low inter-
est rates even after the recovery is underway. By doing so, the authority can in￿ uence current
spending decisions of the private sector, to the extent that they are based on the projected
path of interest rates into the future. This tool has been a key part of the communications
strategy of all central banks over the last year.
2.2 Fiscal stimulus policies
Since monetary policy has essentially reached the limit of its e⁄ectiveness, virtually all gov-
ernments, both in advanced economies and emerging market economies, instigated ￿scal
stimulus packages. Following the G20 meetings in late 2008, in conjunction with the IMF
policy recommendations, a rough consensus emerged on a need for ￿scal stimulus equal to
2See Cespedes, Chang, and Garcia-Cicco (2010) for a discussion of a range of ￿ Heterodox￿central bank
policies.
52 percent of GDP. The breakdown between direct spending and tax cuts was not directly
prescribed however. Table 1 describes the composition of the stimulus packages in the G20
economies. In terms of GDP per capita, after Saudi Arabia, China and the US bring the
largest ￿scal stimulus, with 5 and 6 percent of GDP, respectively. But the packages di⁄er
sharply in their composition, with China￿ s stimulus plan having no tax cut component at
all, while in the US about a third of the overall stimulus is in the form of tax cuts. Britain￿ s
plan is mostly comprised on tax cuts, while Russia and Brazil￿ s stimulus has only tax cuts.
But even without tax cuts, all stimulus plans have been ￿nanced by large increases in public
sector de￿cits. Table 2 illustrates the pre-crisis and post-crisis ￿scal balances (projected)
for G-20 countries. Many of the advanced economies already had very weak ￿scal positions
already in 2007, but de￿cits dramatically increased in most of these countries over the last
year, and are projected to remain far above the pre-crisis trend until 2014 at least. Emerging
economies were generally in a much better ￿scal position before the crisis, but most of these
countries also have had a signi￿cant increase in the ￿scal de￿cit.
While there is signi￿cant consensus on the need for ￿scal stimulus, the magnitude of
the increase in public sector debt, especially among the advanced economies, has raised
considerable concerns (IMF). Table 3 gives the projections for public sector debt for G20
countries. Higher debt has the potential to raise long term real interest rates, crowding out
investment spending and growth, and also potentially raises the prospect of higher future
rates of in￿ ation.
In the analysis below, we discuss a model of the short term alone, abstracting from the
long run costs of ￿scal de￿cits. The key aim of the paper is to illustrate how, in the short
run, de￿cits may have dramatically di⁄erent e⁄ects whether the economy is inside or outside
a liquidity trap. While we do not dismiss the dangers of increasing public sector debt, it
remains true that, at least for the larger economies, these dangers are more in the future
than the present. At present, both the path of long term interest rates and in￿ ationary
expections in most advanced economies seem to indicate little concern for unsustainable debt
levels or high future in￿ ation.
3 The model of overlapping generations
3.1 Demographics and Households
We employ a very standard Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) model of uncertain lifetimes, in
overlapping generations economy. Time is discrete. At any date a cohort of measure 1 ￿ ￿
6households is born, where 0 6 ￿ 6 1. An individual household dies with probability 1 ￿ ￿
in each period, independent of age, so that ￿ is the probability of survival from one period
to the next. Thus, the total population at any time t is ￿t
s=￿1(1 ￿ ￿)￿t￿s = 1. As in
Blanchard￿ s model, we assume a full annuities market, whereby savers get a premium on
lending to cover their unintended bequests, and borrowers pay a premium to cover their






t(logCt;v ￿ v (Ht;v) + g(Gt)) (1)
Here we de￿ne Ct;v as the consumption in time t of cohort v, and Ht;v is labor supply.
Assume that v0(Ht;v) > 0;v00(Ht;v) ￿ 0: Households supply labour in all periods of life, but
real wages are declining over an agent￿ s lifetime in the manner suggested by Blanchard and
Fischer (1989). We assume that the composite consumption good represented by Ct;v is







where ￿ is the elasticity of substitution across individual brands. Households also derive
utility from aggregate government spending, denoted Gt. Government spending is taken as
given by each household, and utility from government spending is separable from utility of
consumption Ct;v. We assume that g0(:) > 0; g00(:) < 0:
We focus on a model without capital, so as to make the comparison with the standard
neo-Keynesian DSGE model as clear as possible. Households have only one form of ￿ outside￿
savings instrument; government bonds. The budget constraint in time t for an agent born
in time v 6 t is




Here Bt+1;v represent the nominal bond holdings of cohort v, and Tt;v represents their net





is the consumer price index.
Real wages in terms of the composite consumption good are denoted wt;v, which are cohort-
speci￿c, as described below. Pro￿ts from ￿rms are represented by ￿t;v: The presence of full
annuity markets implies that rates of return are grossed up to cover the probability of death.
To see this, note that in aggregate, savers will receive a return of ￿￿
(1+it)
￿ +(1￿￿)￿0 = (1+it)
on their bond holdings.














Conditions (3)-(4) characterize optimal consumption and labor supply. In addition, the
household must choose individual brands to minimize expenditure conditional on a given







The Euler equation, in conjunction with the household budget constraint, can be repre-
sented in the ￿ certainty equivalent￿representation3:






i=0￿i(wt+i;vHt+i;v + ￿t+i;v + tt+i;v)
￿
(5)
where 1 + rt =
(1+it)Pt
Pt+1 , tt;v =
Tt;v




s=t(1 + rs)￿1￿s￿t: In order to
re-write (5) in the form of a dynamic equation in aggregate consumption, it is necessary
to be more speci￿c about the way in which wage income evolves over time. Assume that
wt;v = at;vwt; and at;v = a￿at￿1;v; where wt is the economywide average wage, a is a constant
normalization, and 0 6 ￿ 6 14. Thus, relative to the economy-wide average, the wage of each
cohort declines over time. This captures, in a crude way, the declining human capital income
pro￿le coming from the fact of retirement, while still maintaining the ability to aggregate
across cohorts that is central to the Blanchard-Yaari model. In the description of technology
below, we will tie this wage di⁄erential to e⁄ective labour productivity di⁄erences across
time. In addition, in order to allow for easy aggregation to an economy-wide consumption
function, we assume that cohort-speci￿c pro￿ts and taxes obey the same properties as wage
income.
3This representation ignores complications due to Jensen￿ s inequality, and is presented simply to give a
heuristic account of the aggregation process. The analysis of the model is done by ￿rst order approximation
however, and the solution of the aggregate model is exact at this order. Thus, the error has no consequences
for the results below.
4a is chosen so that when the cohort speci￿c wage is averaged across all currently alive cohorts, it equals




To represent economy-wide outcomes, we need to aggregate across cohorts. One immediate
aggregation di¢ culty arises from (4). Because a) households have di⁄erent consumption
levels, and b) each cohort has a di⁄erent productivity of labor in production of ￿nal goods,
it will not be possible to aggregate (4) across generations, in general. To proceed, we then
make the following speci￿c functional form assumption:
v(Ht;v) = ￿Ht;v (6)
Thus, we assume that the disutility of work is linear in hours worked. In that case, we can
aggregate (4) directly across all currently alive cohorts. This restricts the analysis somewhat,
but has the appeal that it leads to a simple prediction for the impacts of monetary and ￿scal
policy shocks when nominal interest rates are positive, and when full Ricardian equivalence
holds. The key question we address is how allowing for both of these features to be relaxed
(zero-interest rates and non-Ricardian equivalence) together impacts on the e⁄ects of policy.
The assumption (6) allows us to write the aggregate labor supply condition as:
￿Ct = wt (7)
The consumption expression (5) may be aggregated across cohorts to give:
Ct = (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
(1 + rt)Bt + Et￿
1
i=0e ￿i(wt+iHt+i + ￿t+i ￿ tt+i)
￿
(8)
where now e ￿i =
Q
s=t(1 + rs)￿1(￿￿)s￿t
In aggregate, the budget constraint for all households is:
Bt+1 = (1 + rt)Bt + wtHt + ￿t ￿ tt ￿ Ct (9)
Note that in the aggregate, there is no ￿ term in the ￿ ow budget constraint, since the risk
premium just represents a transfer from one generation to another.





(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 + rt+1)(1 ￿ ￿￿)bt+1
￿￿
(10)
In contrast to the standard Ramsey model, in this model, the growth in aggregate consump-
tion depends on both interest rates and aggregate wealth. When ￿￿ < 1; and aggregate
wealth is positive, aggregate consumption growth is lower than in the Ramsey model, be-
9cause the average households is e⁄ectively less patient. Equivalently, a rise in the value of
government debt generates a wealth e⁄ect which reduces desired aggregate savings.
3.3 Firms








s=t at;sHt(i;s;j) is ￿rm i￿ s composite employment. The expression
Ht(i;s;j) represents the employment by ￿rm i of household j of cohort s. Each household
in a given cohort s has an identical e⁄ective labour productivity at;s, captured by the process
described above. The idea is that labour of di⁄erent vintages have di⁄erent e¢ ciencies, and
since ￿ < 1, labor income per unit of e⁄ort tends to decline over time, for each cohort. This is
an important feature of the model, since it gives each generation a downward sloping income
pro￿le over their planning horizon. E⁄ectively, it allows for a greater desire to save on the
part of each cohort, and puts the model closer to the standard OLG model with working
and retirement phases of life.
We abstract from capital accumulation, but allow for the presence of a ￿xed factor of
production, so that 0 6 ￿ 6 1. Finally, At is a productivity term, common to all ￿rms.
Retail ￿rms are monopolistically competitive, and face an elasticity of demand given by
￿ > 1 in each period. Firms adjust their prices according to the usual Calvo assumption of
a constant probability of price change, 1 ￿ ￿, however long ago the previous price change
was made. When they adjust their price, ￿rms maximize discounted expected pro￿ts, where
per period pro￿ts for each ￿rm i are ￿t(i) = Pt(i)Yt(i) ￿ WtHt(i). Thus, ￿rm ￿ {0s expected



































10Each newly price setting ￿rm sets the same price. Then, using the law of large numbers, the








The ￿scal authority has expenditure commitments arising from net transfers to households
and direct government spending. For now, we do not separately consider nominal money
balances in the model, so there is no direct measure of seignoriages revenues. Thus, the
￿scal authority obtains revenue simply from net tax receipts Tt and nominal debt issue. The
government budget constraint is given by:
Tt + PtGt = Bt+1 ￿ (1 + it)Bt (13)
We allow for a number of di⁄erent possible con￿gurations of ￿scal policy rules. One such
rule is to take the path of government spending as exogenously given to the ￿scal authority,
and adjust the net transfer so as to achieve a given target for the debt to GDP ratio.
Alternatively, net transfers could be adjusted so as to keep the government budget in balance
in every period, maintaining a constant path of (real or nominal) government debt.
3.5 Monetary policy
Assume that the monetary authority follows an interest rate rule, given by:
i
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where ￿t represents a desired path for the equilibrium real interest rate, ￿ represents a desired
path for the in￿ ation rate, and b Y is the target level of aggregate output. We assume that
￿￿ > 1 and ￿y > 0. This rule is somewhat unrealistic in that we do not allow for interest
rate ￿ smoothing￿ . This is not critical for the results, however.
The monetary authority can follow the rule (14) only when iR
t > 0 however. If the rule
stipulates a negative nominal interest rate, then the central bank is constrained by the zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates. Thus, the path of nominal interest rates in the model













t = Yt = Gt + Ct (16)
The zero lower bound condition (15) is usually thought of as a constraint on the short run
behavior of monetary policy. But this is not necessarily the case. For instance, if the
monetary authority has a long turn target for in￿ ation that is low enough, it is possible that
the long run real interest rate is forced down to the level where the zero bound is a binding
constraint. Although this has no consequences for the long run path of output, it does place
a condition on the required path of real government debt. We explore this issue brie￿ y in
the next section.
4 Long run ￿ exible price equilibrium
In a ￿ exible price equilibrium (7) and (12) give the solution for equilibrium aggregate output:
￿￿
￿ ￿ 1
(Y ￿ G) = (1 ￿ ￿)A
1=(1￿￿)Y
￿￿=(1￿￿) (17)





1 ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ gy)￿
(18)
where gy ￿ G
Y < 1. The multiplier is increasing in the steady state ratio of government
spending to GDP, but it must be no greater than unity.
De￿ne by = b
Y as the long run government debt to GDP ratio. For a given value of gy;




￿ 1) = ￿(1 + r)by (19)
where ￿ ￿
(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿￿(1￿gy) . The real interest rate is increasing in the steady state government
debt-GDP ratio. In this model, without capital, government debt does not crowd out real
investment, and has no e⁄ect on steady state aggregate output or consumption. But a higher
by increases real interest rates, and tilts the pro￿le of consumption of each generation towards
the future.
The steady state nominal interest rate is obtained from (14), taking the desired real
12interest rate ￿ as constant.
(1 + i) = (1 + r)(1 + ￿); i > 0 (20)
(1 + ￿) = (1 + r)
￿1; i = 0 (21)
For a given target rate of real interest rate, in￿ ation, and output, there may be more than
one in￿ ation rate satisfying these conditions, where i is de￿ned by (15). For instance, one
equilibrium is given by ￿ = b ￿; Y = b Y and i = ￿. But another equilibrium is given by:
i = 0; ￿ =
￿
(1 + ￿)(1 + b ￿)
1￿￿￿￿￿ 1
￿￿ ￿ 1
Benhabib et al. (2002) were the ￿rst to demonstrate that Taylor rules will in general
be associated with multiple equilibrium rates of in￿ ation when nominal interest rates are
bounded below by zero. Here we focus only on equilibria with positive in￿ ation rates, where
the steady state in￿ ation rate is equal to the target rate b ￿5. In this economy, there is only
one such equilibrium consistent with (19) and (15). Thus, we may re-write (20) as
(1 + i) = (1 + r)(1 + b ￿); i > 0 (22)
(1 + b ￿) = (1 + r)
￿1; i = 0 (23)
The two conditions (19) and (22) have separate interpretations, depending upon whether
the nominal interest rate is positive or at the zero lower bound. When i > 0, the conditions
determine i and r separately, for given b ￿ and by. The steady state monetary rule (14)
determines b ￿; while by is determined by steady state ￿scal policy, consistent with (13), in
conjunction with an appropriate transversality condition. Thus, monetary and ￿scal policy
can be thought of as independent in a steady state with i > 0. Moreover, there is a recursive
structure such that the ￿scal stance, summarized by the value of by, determines r, while the
in￿ ation target determines i.
But (19) and (22) may also be associated with an equilibrium where i = 0; the nominal
interest rate is at the zero lower bound. From (22), this can occur only if r < 0; that is,
if the economy is dynamically ine¢ cient. From (19), dynamic ine¢ ciency can occur, even
when by > 0, when ￿ < 1. If each cohort has a declining wage pro￿le over time, the economy
may be dynamically ine¢ cient even if government debt to GDP is positive.
The behavior of the steady state under the zero lower bound is fundamentally di⁄erent
5This requires that the authority have a steady state target real interest rate equal to the real interest
rate implied by (19), and a steady state target for output equal to that implied by (17).










Condition (24) de￿nes the sense in which monetary and ￿scal policy are interdependent in
an economy at the zero lower bound6. If the government debt-GDP ratio is such that the
equilibrium real interest rate is negative, then the target rate of in￿ ation must be uniquely
determined. Conversely, if the target rate of in￿ ation is taken as given, then the debt-GDP
ratio must be adjusted so as to achieve the equilibrium real interest implied by this target.
Moreover, at the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, the steady state is no longer
recursive. A higher value of ￿T implies a lower (more negative) real interest rate, and must
be accompanied by a fall in by, holding gy and all the other variables constant.
Figure 2 illustrates the trade-o⁄ implied by (24). In the Figure, e by represents the value
of the debt ratio for which r = 0, implied by (19). For by < e by; the real interest rate is
negative. Whether the economy is stuck at the zero lower bound depends on the in￿ ation
target. The schedule MF illustrates (24). For a given by < e by; the lower is the in￿ ation
target, the more likely that the economy will be at the zero lower bound. MF describes the
required values of by for each value of the in￿ ation target, when the economy is stuck at the
zero lower bound. Thus, in a steady state, there must be a negative relationship between
government debt and the in￿ ation rate, when the economy is at the zero lower bound7.
Intuitively, the condition says that, in the long run, if monetary authorities are committed
to low in￿ ation targets, then low real interest rate episodes are likely to push them to the
zero bound. If they continue to be committed by a low in￿ ation target at the zero bound,
then it really means that they are preventing the real interest rate from falling any further.
This can only be done through giving up control of the outstanding stock of government
debt. Equivalently, if the ￿scal authority insists on reducing the stock of real debt in an
environment where the real interest rate is pushed below zero, then the monetary authorities
must accommodate this with a higher rate of in￿ ation. In either case, with a permanent
zero nominal interest rate, there must be a negative relationship between government debt
and in￿ ation.
6Leeper (2010) provides an alternative view of the interaction between monetary and ￿scal policy even
when nominal interest rates are positive, based on the interdependence implied by the public sector budget
constraint.
7Beaudry, Devereux and Siu (2009) examine this restriction in a more complete dynamic growth model.
Condition (24) abstracts from the possibility of bubble equilibria. When the real interest rate is negative,
it is possible that other non-fundamental assets may be valued in equilibrium, so that total wealth would
include both the value of government debt and the bubble asset.
145 Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Short-Run under
a zero lower bound
We now turn to an analysis of the model in the short run, when prices adjust as in (12). As
in Christiano et al. (2009), Woodford and Eggertson (2003, 2005), and Eggertson (2009),
we wish to explore the usefulness of monetary and ￿scal policy in responding to an envi-
ronment where the economy has been pushed to a zero lower bound - that is, where the
nominal interest rate is stuck at zero for some time period. Initially, we will just compare
the di⁄erential e⁄ects of policy in the two environments - one where the nominal interest rate
operates according to a standard Taylor rule and another where the nominal interest rate is
zero. This gives us the basic contrasting results of this section. We later provide a quanti-
tative comparison the usefulness of alternative monetary and ￿scal policies in responding to
the zero-lower bound constraint.
Under what circumstances should the policymaker face a zero interest rate constraint?
As in the previous literature, we may think of this situation as generated by a large increase
in the representative agents￿discount factor, raising desired savings and pushing down the
￿ exible price equilibrium real interest rate. If the policy maker follows a Taylor rule, as in
(14), then the nominal interest rate may be pushed down to its lower bound. The increase
in desired savings leads to a fall in aggregate demand and a fall in the output gap. The
optimal response to this shock in normal times would be to reduce nominal interest rates so
as to facilitate the required real interest rate adjustment. But when nominal interest rates
are zero, they cannot be reduced further. How should policy respond? Two main answers
have been o⁄ered in the literature. Krugman (1998), Jung et al (2005), and Eggertson
and Woodford (2003) discuss a range of alternative monetary policy rules that may be used
despite the fact that the interest rate is held at or near zero for some time. The common
feature of of these proposals is that the policy maker should make an announcement about
the conduct of monetary policy in the periods after the economy has left the zero bound
region. If the authority announces that policy will remain loose even after the zero bound
no longer binds, then it acts so as to lessen the de￿ ationary impact of the current shock.
The obvious di¢ culty with using monetary policy in this way is that the announcement
must be credible for it to have any e⁄ect on current output and in￿ ation. The policy-maker
must follow a history- dependent rule, continuing to pursue monetary easing even after the
conditions that warrant such easing have elapsed. Eggertson and Woodford (2003) discuss
a range of targets for the monetary authority to follow that would replicate the optimal
history dependent rule, but may be easier to communicate to the public.
15The second main response to a zero lower bound trap is the use of ￿scal policy. Fiscal
policy may be used to directly in￿ uence aggregate demand in the traditional Keynesian
manner, even when the monetary authority has no ability to reduce interest rates any further.
Fiscal policy options for the zero lower bound trap are discussed by Christiano et al. (2009),
Eggertston (2009), and Cogan et al. (2009).
One common characteristic of the previous literature analyzing the role of policy at the
zero lower bound is that the models display Ricardian equivalence. Hence, the ￿nancing of
government spending expansion has no role to play, and the real balance e⁄ects of monetary
policy are not operative. In the recent policy discussion summarised in Section 1, however,
the need to run government de￿cits, generated either by tax cuts or bond ￿nanced govern-
ment spending increases, is seen as a paramount part of the stimulus package in all countries.
The notion that the large ￿scal expansions that are taking place in many countries could
just as easily be ￿nanced with tax increases as with government de￿cits seems completely at
variance with all policy discussion. Hence, it is important to be able to analyze the impact
of ￿scal de￿cits when interest rates are stuck at the zero lower bound, and to compare this
with the case where interest rates are employed as part of a regular monetary policy. The
advantage of using the current model is that we can separately analyze the role played by
tax cuts and spending increases, and distinguish between debt ￿nanced and tax-￿nanced
￿scal expansion. In addition, we may analyze separately the real balance e⁄ects monetary
policy, which can operate even at zero interest rates8.
5.1 Approximating the model under a Taylor rule.
In the case where nominal interest rates are positive and adjust according to (14), we have
a standard New Keynesian model, save for the presence of government debt in the Euler
equation (10). Using (10) and (16), we may approximate (10) as follows:
b Yt+1 = b Yt + ((it+1 ￿ Et￿t+1) + b ￿t+1) ￿ ￿b bt+1 ￿ Et(b Gt+1 ￿ b Gt) (25)
where b Yt = log(Yt
Y ); b Gt = Gt￿G
Y , b ￿t = log( Pt
Pt￿1); b bt = bt￿b
Y , and ￿ ￿
(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿￿(1￿gy) . The
linear approximation is taken around an initial debt-GDP ratio equal to zero9, so that
b = 0. The government spending shock represents a deviation of government spending
8Ireland (2005) emphasizes the ￿ real balance e⁄ect￿of monetary policy, which can operate even when
the nominal interest rate is zero. He does so in a purely ￿ exible price model though, similar to the case of
section 2 above.
9This facilitates the exposition. Allowing for non-zero debt ratios requires the interest rate to be an
additional state variable, which makes the algebra more complicated, but does not substantially change the
results so long as by is not too large. .
16from the steady state level, relative to GDP. We are assuming that there is an optimal
(￿ exible price equilibrium) level of government spending to given by G; and movements
in government spending here represent deviations from the optimum. The variable b ￿t
represents a temporary shock to the discount factor, where we assume that the discount
factor can be represented as ￿t = ￿ exp(￿t), and the steady state value of ￿, is set at
zero; ￿ = 0. The departure from full Ricardian equivalence is governed by the composite
coe¢ cient ￿, which depends on the steady state discount rate, the probability of survival,
and the time path of labor income within each cohort.
The forward looking in￿ ation equation follows in standard fashion from the ￿rst order
approximation of (12) and the de￿nition of the price index.
￿t = ￿
 










￿((1￿￿)+￿￿) . The term in brackets represents the deviation of real marginal
cost from its steady state level, given the assumptions on the disutility of labour for each
generation.
The linear approximation of the interest rate rule is written as:
i
R
t = ￿ + ￿ + ￿￿ (￿t ￿ ￿) + ￿yb Yt (27)
In this section, we assume that iR
t > 0, so that the interest rate always follows (27).
Finally, we take a linear approximation of the government budget constraint as follows:
b bt+1 = (1 + r)b bt + b Gt ￿ b Tt (28)
where b Tt = Tt￿T
Y . Since we are approximating around an initial steady state with a
zero debt-GDP ratio, this approximation does not depend on the ￿rst order dynamics of
the real interest rate. On its own however, (28) will involve non-stationary dynamics in
the government debt-ratio. To avoid this, we assume that the ￿scal authority chooses a
tax rule so that the dynamics of aggregate government debt to GDP are stationary, for
given government spending movements. In particular, we assume that net taxes have a
discretionary and an automatic component, such that:
b Tt = b T1t + tb bt (29)
where t is constant, and is chosen such that ! = 1 + r ￿ t < 1: This ensures that following
17a temporary shock to government spending or the discretionary component of taxes which
leaves the long run real primary de￿cit unchanged, the debt level will return to its steady
state.
5.2 Shocks to the the discount factor
A natural way to think about policy being constrained by the lower bound on interest rates
is that an increased desire to save drives down the equilibrium ￿ exible price real interest
rate. Under an in￿ ation targeting monetary rule, this requires a fall in the nominal interest
rate. The variable b ￿t, representing a shock to the discount factor, increases the ex-ante
savings rate of all generations. Assume that b ￿t is governed by the process:
b ￿t+1 = ￿b ￿t + "t+1;
Et("t+1) = 0. An increase in the discount factor leads to a persistent fall in the equilibrium
real interest rate. Using the interest rate rule (27), the impact of the shock can be obtained
from the solution to (25)-(29). The increase in the discount factor increases the desire to
save, reducing aggregate demand, causing a fall in both output and in￿ ation. The responses
of output and in￿ ation are given by:
b Yt = ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿￿
b ￿t+1 (30)






(1￿gy) ; and ￿￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿y)) + ￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿)z) > 0.
The impact of a discount factor shock is cushioned by the endogenous response of interest
rates. The higher the response of interest rates to in￿ ation and the output gap, the smaller
is the e⁄ect of the shock. In the framework of optimal monetary policy as presented
in Woodford (2003), a discount factor shock can be fully accommodated by an optimal
monetary response that goes beyond the interest rate rule, reducing nominal interest rates
by the extent of the shock itself, fully stabilizing output and in￿ ation. But this requires that
the authorities have su¢ cient leeway to adjust the nominal interest rate downwards. For
large enough shocks, the zero bound on the interest rate may apply, and some alternative
monetary or ￿scal policy needs to be employed in order to respond to the shock. Before we
analyze the response of the economy under a zero bound, however, we investigate the impact
of ￿scal policy shocks when the nominal interest rate is positive, and the economy operates
18under the monetary rule (27).
5.3 Government Spending, Debt and Tax Shocks Under a Taylor
Rule
The e⁄ects of government spending shocks in this type of model have been analyzed in a
number of previous papers. The only di⁄erence here, relative to the previous literature,
is the failure of Ricardian equivalence, and the e⁄ects of government debt accumulation.
In order to highlight this di⁄erence, we ￿rst examine the impact of a one time shock to
government debt. It is easy to solve (25)-(29) to show that the e⁄ect of a increase in bt on
output and in￿ ation is as follows:
b Yt =







where ￿! = (1￿￿)(1￿￿!)(1￿!+￿y))+￿(￿￿￿!)z) > 0. An increase in government debt
is perceived as an increase in wealth for currently alive cohorts. This leads to an increase in
consumption, and a fall in desired saving. Current aggregate demand rises, leading to a rise
in in￿ ation. The rise in in￿ ation increases the real interest rate, via the interest rate rule,
partly o⁄setting the impact of the higher debt on current output. The greater the response
to in￿ ation or the output gap in the interest rate rule, the greater the increase in the real
interest rate, and the smaller the impact on output and in￿ ation. Note also that the impact
of a debt shock depends on the persistence in government debt generated by the government
budget constraint. If the debt-sensitive tax rule is such that an initial debt shock is very
transitory (i.e. ! very low), the impact on output or in￿ ation is small.
We can now focus on the e⁄ects of government spending and taxes. To provide a bench-
mark comparison with the Ricardian equivalence case, we focus ￿rst on a government spend-
ing expansion ￿nanced by a tax increase - that is, we calculate the balanced budget multiplier.
Assume that both discretionary taxes and government spending increase by the same
amount. In both cases, assume that after the initial increase, both discretionary taxes and
spending converge back to their steady state levels at the rate ￿. Then, from (25)-(29), we
may compute that:
b Yt =




￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿y=(1 ￿ gy)
￿￿
b Gt (35)
The ￿rst thing to note about (??) is that it is independent of ￿, the coe¢ cient on
government debt in the aggregate Euler equation. The balanced budget multiplier is the same
as that of the standard Ricardian equivalence model, because the policy has no consequences
for the evolution of government debt. In addition, it is easily seen that the multiplier is less




￿ 1) = ￿Sign[(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿y + ￿￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿)] < 0:
Even though prices are sticky and adjust only slowly in face of changes in aggregate de-
mand, the balanced budget multiplier is actually less than that of the purely ￿ exible price
equilibrium multiplier. The key reason is that under the (27) monetary policy rule, the real
interest rate increases so much in response to a rise in ￿scal spending (￿nanced by taxation)
that aggregate private consumption falls. Only in the special case of constant returns in
production (￿ = 0), and no output gap in the interest rate rule (￿y = 0) will the multiplier
be exactly unity - equal to that of the ￿ exible price equilibrium.
This suggests that if the nominal interest rate is free to adjust and follows a standard rule
(27), government spending is a particularly ine¢ cient way to stimulate the economy. The
most that a ￿scal expansion can do is to leave aggregate private consumption unchanged,
and in general consumption will fall. Equivalently, we can say that government spending
expansion increases output, but output actually falls below the level it would attain in a
￿ exible price equilibrium, in face of the same balanced budget government spending increase.
The impact of a balanced budget government expansion on in￿ ation is given by (35). If
￿y = 0 and ￿ = 0, the in￿ ation rate is unchanged, because output responds exactly as in
a ￿ exible price equilibrium. With constant returns (￿ = 0) and ￿y > 0; in￿ ation will fall,
since output is below the ￿ exible price equilibrium.
We now turn to the analysis of a tax cut in the model with an interest rate rule. A
temporary discretionary tax cut will increase the primary government de￿cit and cause a
persistent increase in government debt. How will this a⁄ect GDP? From (25)-(29) we can
establish that:
b Yt = ￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)2(1 ￿ ￿!)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 + ￿y) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿z(￿!(￿￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))
￿￿￿!
b Tt (36)
Note that with Ricardian equivalence, where ￿ = 0, this is negative by de￿nition. For
￿ > 0, we would anticipate that the expression on the right hand side of (??) is negative
20(tax increases are contractionary). Interestingly however, this is not necessarily true in this
model. Take the case where ￿ and ! are very close to unity (tax cuts are highly persistent,
and the de￿cit is closed only very slowly). Then expression (??) is positive for ￿￿ > 1, and
therefore a cut in taxes will reduce GDP in the economy where the interest rate follows a
Taylor rule!
What is the explanation for this? The reason is that, for ￿￿ greater than unity, and
su¢ ciently large, a tax cut causes a large o⁄setting increase in interest rates, due to its
in￿ ationary e⁄ects. The impact of a tax cut on current in￿ ation is always positive, and
given by:
b ￿t = ￿￿z￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿y ￿ ￿!￿) + ￿z￿￿
￿￿￿!
b Tt (37)
A very persistent tax cut signals a persistent increase in future government debt, which
causes the forecast of future in￿ ation to rise, increasing current in￿ ation, and leading to a
rise in current interest rates. This secondary e⁄ect can be actually large enough to reduce
aggregate demand and lead to a fall in output. Thus, again, we may conclude that during
￿ normal times￿ , when the nominal interest rate follows a conventional rule of the type given
by (14), tax cuts are unlikely to be an e⁄ective stabilization tool.
Note that we have not yet given a quantitative analysis of the e⁄ects of tax cuts and
government spending policies in this model. In the discussion of the calibrated model
below, we show that for both policies, the multiplier e⁄ects of government spending and tax
cuts (even if the latter are positive) are likely to be quite low.
5.4 Fiscal policies under a zero lower bound.
Now assume that the shock to the discount factor is large enough to push the economy into
a liquidity trap - the nominal interest rate is constrained by the zero lower bound10. In
this case, the dynamics of the economy are fundamentally di⁄erent. The e⁄ects on in￿ ation
and the output gap both of the initial shock as well as the impact of policy measures to
counter the shock operate through substantially di⁄erent channels when the policy interest
rate cannot respond.
In section 2 above, we analyzed the properties of a steady state in which the nominal
interest rate is at the zero lower bound. By contrast, here we will focus on a situation where
the lower bound constraint is temporary; the rise in the discount factor dissipates over time,
10In order to ensure that the approximations remain accurate at the zero lower bound, it is necessary
to place restrictions of the size of the discount factor shock which places to economy at the bound. See
Eggertson and Woodford (2003).
21and the economy￿ s real interest rate returns to its steady state. In a crude way, this captures
the impact of an aggregate demand shock coming from an unanticipated temporary rise in
the savings rate11.
To make the analysis concrete, we follow Eggerston and Woodford (2003, 2005) and
Eggertson (2009) in assuming that the discount factor shock drives the economy to the
zero lower bound for an uncertain number of periods. We assume a one time shock to the
discount factor that continues with probability ￿ per period. So in each future period, the
discount factor reverts to the steady state with probability 1 ￿ ￿. In the intervening time,
the discount factor is at its post-shock level, and is su¢ ciently high that the policy implied
by the original interest rate rule would require a zero interest rate. As in Eggertson and
Woodford (2003,2005), Eggerston (2009), and Christiano et al. (2009), we investigate both
the impact of the original shock, as well as the impact of an alternative series of monetary
and ￿scal policies when the economy operates at the zero interest rate bound.
Solving the model (25)-(29) when iR
t = 0, under the assumption that the shock reverts
back to steady state with probability 1￿￿, we obtain the impact of the discount rate shock
on the output gap and in￿ ation as:
b Yt = ￿










￿ = (1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿)￿￿￿z. A condition for stability is that ￿z
￿ > 012. Note
however that ￿￿￿￿z
￿ = (1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)￿y+￿￿￿￿z > 0. Hence in comparing (30) and (38),
the impact of a rise in the discount factor on both in￿ ation and the output gap is larger in
an economy constrained by the zero lower bound. This is not surprising, and follows as a
converse argument to the logic presented above, outlining the response of in￿ ation and the
output gap under an interest rate rule. Since the nominal interest rate cannot respond, the
fall in demand leads to a fall in output, which reduces in￿ ation, and given the persistence of
the shock, the fall in anticipated in￿ ation leads to a rise in the real interest rate, a further
11In the case of a permanent zero lower bound, the conditions for a unique stable path of adjustment
of in￿ ation, output and government debt are not always met. In particular, in the Ricardian equivalence
version of this model (when ￿ = 0), the conditions for uniqueness in the zero interest rate case are not met
for familiar reasons (e.g. Clarida et al. 1999). But with ￿ > 0 and allowing for a non-zero initial nominal
government debt, there is a ￿ real balance e⁄ect￿which may be su¢ cient to restore uniqueness (Ireland 2005),
even if the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero forever. Nevertheless, because we are primarily concerned
with the analysis of short run stabilization policies, we follow the recent literature and analyze the (somewhat
more realitistic) case of a temporary liquidity trap.
12See Eggertson (2009).
22fall in demand, and a larger fall in output. So long as ￿z
￿ > 0, this process converges, but
to a much lower level of output than would occur under a positive interest rate rule.
How do monetary and ￿scal policies operate when the interest rate is zero? Again, we
focus on the importance of debt and de￿cit related policies, given that the key aspect of
the analysis is the failure of Ricardian equivalence. In order to make the analysis simple
and easily comparable with the previous section, we initially make the special assumption
that the ￿scal policies enacted during the period where the economy is constrained by the
zero lower bound are eliminated completely when the constraint is no longer binding, and
the economy then reverts immediately to its steady state. This involves the assumption
that at the period of the return to positive interest rates, taxes are raised so as to eliminate
completely the accumulate government debt that resulted from the ￿scal policy expansions.
Hence, that the government debt buildup from its initial steady state (or zero) is wiped
away, and debt reverts back to zero in the period following the return to positive interest
rates. This allows the economy to return to a steady state. This assumption makes the
algebraic comparison with the previous section very simple, but it is not a critical feature
of the argument. We explore an alternative case below, where the accumulated debt is
only gradually eliminated, following the return to a path of positive nominal interest rates.
There we see that all of the points made in this section still remain valid. In fact, because
the accumulated debt continues to be treated as net wealth by the cohorts who hold it after
the return to positive interest rates, this alternative path of convergence make the impact of
current ￿scal policies even stronger.
First, we may analyze the impact of an arbitrary rise in government debt, in a manner
similar to (32) and (33) above.
b Yt =









where ￿!￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿!)(1 ￿ !￿)) ￿ ￿￿!z: Again, for stability, it is necessary that
￿!￿ > 0.
As in the case of a positive nominal rate, an increase in government debt leads to a rise in
the output gap and a rise in the in￿ ation rate, so long as Ricardian equivalence fails (￿ > 0):
The quantitative impact may be greater or less than (32) and (33). On the one hand, the
nominal interest rate does not respond here, leading to a larger impact on both in￿ ation
and the output gap. However, in this experiment, the interest rate rule reverts back to
23(14) with probability 1 ￿ ￿. In the quantitative analysis below, it is shown that the e⁄ects
of increasing government debt may be greater or less during a liquidity trap than under a
positive interest rate rule.
If a rise in the discount factor has a greater negative impact on the output gap in a
liquidity trap, it is reasonable to consider that compensating ￿scal policies would also be
more powerful in their ability to stabilize the economy, since an expansion in government
spending or a tax cut in this environment does not elicit automatic interest rate responses
that limit the extent to the ￿scal instruments. In this vein, Christiano et al. (2009)
and Eggerston (2009) show that government spending policies may have signi￿cantly higher
multiplier e⁄ects in a liquidity trap than during normal times. But again, their analysis was
con￿ned to the situation of full Ricardian equivalence, where a balanced budget expansion
in government spending is identical to a debt ￿nanced expansion. We now wish to revisit
this question, allowing for debt versus tax ￿nanced spending policies to have di⁄erent e⁄ects.
As a corollary, we can investigate, as we did above for the case outside the liquidity trap,
the e⁄ect of tax cuts compared to government spending expansions.
Using (25)-(29) we can establish that a balanced budget increase in government spending
has the following impacts on the output gap and in￿ ation.
b Yt =









(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿)￿￿￿z. From (42) we see that the multiplier e⁄ect on output exceeds
unity whenever ￿(1￿gy) > 0. Hence, the balanced budget government spending multiplier
is always greater in a liquidity trap than in the case where the nominal interest rate is positive
and responds according to a Taylor rule. But it is not necessarily true that the multiplier
is large. When ￿ = 0, the multiplier is exactly unity - a balanced budget expansion has no
impact at all on private consumption. In addition, we note that the in￿ ationary e⁄ects of
a balanced budget increase in spending also exceed those under the Taylor rule. This is for
two reasons - ￿rst, in the absence of endogenous interest rate adjustment to the output gap
(i.e. ￿y = 0), the multiplier impacts of shocks are greater in the zero lower bound economy
anyway, since ￿z
￿ < ￿￿. But in addition, when ￿y > 0; as we saw in expression (34) above,
the interest rate response to a government spending increase in the Taylor rule economy
will mitigate the impact on in￿ ation in a way that is not present in the zero lower bound
economy.
24In the economy with the Taylor rule, we saw paradoxically that a tax ￿nanced spending
increase could be more or less expansionary that the equivalent increase ￿nanced by de￿cits.
In the recent rounds of stimulus packages enacted in many countries, an important feature
of the spending policies was that they were speci￿cally not ￿nanced by tax increases but by
debt issue. In fact, an essential part of the rationale behind the intervention was to combine
spending increases with tax cuts so as to stimulate overall spending. When nominal interest
rates cannot be lowered further, this was seen as the last possible channel for stabilization
policy. Again however, in the context of our framework, this only makes sense if Ricardian
equivalence fails. To examine this argument, we now focus on the e⁄ects of tax cuts in
the model constrained by the zero lower bound. Again, using (25)-(29), we can derive the
responses of the output gap and in￿ ation as:
b Yt =





b ￿t = ￿￿￿





The expression in (44) is always negative. Hence, in contrast to the case with positive
interest rates, tax cuts are always expansionary at the zero lower bound, so long as Ricardian
equivalence fails. Tax cuts increase private sector wealth, leading to a fall in private saving
and an increase in aggregate demand and output. Tax cuts also increase the growth of
government debt. At the same time, tax cuts are also in￿ ationary, as the output gap
increases in response to the increase in aggregate demand, as con￿rmed by (45). Unlike the
case where the Taylor rule applies, however, there is no compensating increase in the policy
interest rate resulting from the increase in in￿ ation. This allows the possibility that tax
cuts may be substantially more expansionary in the economy stuck at the zero lower bound.
In order to assess the validity of the arguments for de￿cit ￿nancing as an important tool of
stabilization, however, we must turn to a quantitative assessment of the strength of these
e⁄ects.
5.5 Quantitative Comparison of Policies
How big are the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy in the economy within a liquidity trap? We take the
calibration presented in Table 4. The parameter values are quite standard and follow the
assumptions made in the recent literature in this area, save for the particular assumptions we
have made so as to allow for aggregation in the OLG model ( log utility, and linear disutility
of leisure). We look at two versions of each model, one with constant returns to scale, and
25another with decreasing returns to labor, assuming that ￿ = 0:3. In the ￿rst model, we
follow Christiano et al. (2009) in setting the discount factor is 0.99, and the Calvo price
adjustment is parameter ￿ at 0.85, so that ￿ = 0:028. In the second version, with ￿ = 0:3,
the de￿nition of ￿ is di⁄erent, so we choose ￿ at a di⁄erent value (0.7), and ￿ = 10; so as to
reproduce ￿ = 0:025. We initially set the parameters of the interest rate rule at ￿￿ = 1:5
and ￿y = 0; but we also look at variations on these settings. In addition we set the steady
state government spending ratio equal to 0.15, approximately the relevant value for the US
economy.
The parameters governing the cohort time-horizon are very important in assessing the
degree to which government de￿cits have any a⁄ect on real allocations. It is well known that
if the household planning horizon in the Blanchard Yaari model is too great, then the results
are quantitatively equivalent to a model with an in￿nite horizon (e.g. Evans 1991). As a
result of this, the quantitative literature exploring the impacts of de￿cits using the Blanchard
Yaari model have usually interpreted the probability of death in a broader manner than that
implied by straightforward demographic data. Bayoumi and Sgherri (2008) directly estimate
the Blanchard Yaari parameters from a reduced form consumption function coming from the
model, and ￿nd estimates of ￿ below 0.8 at an annual frequency. This implies a ￿ve year
horizon to the consumers in their planning decision. We choose ￿ to match this at the
quarterly frequency. As regards the parameter ￿, governing the rate of earnings decline over
the lifetime, we have little direct evidence to match this. We simply take as a rough estimate
the fact that agents spend about two third of adult lives working and one third retired, so
we set ￿ = 0:6. In combination with the assumption for ￿; these assumptions imply that
￿ is about 0.011 at the quarterly frequency. We should note that this calibration is not
guaranteed to enlarge the impact of government de￿cits. Even with these assumptions on
the planning horizon and wage distribution, we will show that the e⁄ects of de￿cits under a
Taylor rule are very slight.
The parameter ￿, governing the number of periods for which it is anticipated that the
zero lower bound on interest rate will apply, is a critical feature of the dynamics. If this
is too large, then the stability condition is not satis￿ed. We set ￿ = 0:8, so that nominal
interest rates are anticipated to be zero for 5 quarters13. To make the comparison with the
economy under the Taylor rule, we also assume that all shocks in that case have persistence
equal to 0.8.
Table 5 presents quantitative results comparing the e⁄ects of policies under the Taylor
13This is not a necessary feature of the solution. It would be possible to allow the zero lower bound to
be operative for a ￿nite but known number of periods, after which the economy converges back to steady
state. In this case, the duration of the zero interest rate phase could be extended arbitrarily.
26rule in comparison with the economy constrained by the zero lower bound on interest rates.
In the baseline calibration, we see that the impact of a discount factor shock in the economy
at the zero lower bound is orders of magitude more than that of in the economy operating
under a Taylor rule. This shock increases the desire to save, reducing current demand
and output and in￿ ation. In the economy operating under a Taylor rule, the nominal
interest rate will fall, leading to a fall in the real interest rate, reducing the incentive to save.
The equilibrium real interest rate falls. By contrast, when the nominal interest rate cannot
respond, the way the increased desired savings is satis￿ed in equilibrium is for current output
to fall relative to expected future output. But the fall in current output leads to a fall in
current in￿ ation, which raises the real interest rate, increasing the desire to save. When
￿ < 1, and the stability conditions on the model under the zero lower bound are satis￿ed,
this process has an eventual equilibrium leading to a very large fall in current output.
The second panel of Table 2 illustrates the impact of ￿scal policies in both interest rate
scenarios, under the baseline calibration with ￿ = 0 (constant returns to scale). In both
cases, the balanced budget multiplier is unity. Even though the impact of demand shocks
is potentially much greater in the zero lower bound economy, in which the real interest rate
may respond pathologically, this is a case in which a demand shock requires no real interest
rate responses at all. When the government spending expansion is ￿nanced by current
taxation, there is no consequence at all for government debt. Output responds one for one
to the expansion both in the current period and all future periods in which the expansion
continues. Consumption is una⁄ected. As a result, there is no need for the real interest to
move. Thus, under this calibration, the zero lower bound has no implication at all for the
e⁄ects of balanced budget ￿scal expansions (although as we see below, this conclusion may
be substantially altered with di⁄erent monetary rules or decreasing returns to scale).
Now take the same calibration, but assume that the government spending expansion
is de￿cit ￿nanced. This leads to a simultaneous increase in government spending and
government debt. The rise in government debt leads to a wealth induced increase in private
consumption, as in the aggregate, households choose to save less. As a result, the government
spending multiplier exceeds unity in both the economy with positive and zero interest rates.
But the scale of the responses di⁄ers dramatically between the Taylor rule economy and
the zero lower bound economy. In the Taylor rule case, the expansion in aggregate demand
causes an increase in in￿ ation which leads to a rise in the real interest rate. This substantially
reduces the impact of government debt on private consumption. The government spending
multiplier rises from unity under a balanced budget expansion to only 1.07 in the economy
with de￿cit ￿nancing.
27In the economy constrained by the zero lower bound, the in￿ ation generated by the
increased government spending leads to a fall in the real interest rate. This substantially
increases the government spending multiplier. In the baseline case, the multiplier rises
from unity under a balanced budget expansion to approximately 2 under de￿cit ￿nancing
of government spending. Thus, while tax-￿nanced government spending has no additional
expansionary e⁄ects in a liquidity trap, de￿cit ￿nanced spending is far more expansionary.
When the economy is constrained by the zero lower bound, there is a very large di⁄erence in
the predicted e⁄ects of ￿scal expansions depending on whether they are ￿nanced with debt
or with taxes. De￿cit spending has a much greater impact on output than tax ￿nanced
spending.
An immediate corollary of these results is that the impact of pure tax cuts, holding the
path of government spending ￿xed, is substantially di⁄erent in the Taylor rule economy to
that constrained by the zero lower bound. In the ￿rst case, tax cuts generate an expansion
by increasing private wealth, and raising aggregate household saving. Although the economy
does not exhibit Ricardian equivalence under the Taylor rule, the scale of the response to tax
cuts is very small. A tax cut of 1 percent of GDP generates an increasing in output of only
0.08 percent of GDP. Hence as a ￿rst approximation, the economy with a Taylor rule has
negligible departures from Ricardian equivalence, and tax reductions have little stimulatory
e⁄ect.
By contrast, at the zero lower bound, the tax cuts have a very big e⁄ect. A tax cut
of 1 percent of GDP lead to an increase in output equal to about 1 percent of GDP - the
tax multiplier is unity. Tax cuts, even though they leave the presented discounted value of
tax government tax revenues unchanged, lead to an increase in perceived lifetime wealth or
currently alive generations. This increases current demand and output. But this in turn
leads to an increase in in￿ ation, which causes a fall in real interest rates, further increasing
present aggregate demand.
One aspect of the model that seems somewhat counterfactual is the responses of in￿ ation
in a zero lower bound. Since in the model, in￿ ation is purely forward looking, ￿scal policies
can generate substantial e⁄ects on in￿ ation, even in a liquidity trap. In fact, the e⁄ects
of ￿scal policies on in￿ ation are greater with zero interest rates than the responses under a
Taylor rule. We could improve the performance of the model in this respect by introducing
some backward looking elements into the in￿ ation process.
Table 6 also provides some alternative calibrations. In particular, if the interest rate rule
is extended to allow for the output gap, setting ￿y = 0:25, a value close to empirical estimates,
then the multiplier impact of all shocks on the output gap is scaled down in the economy
28governed by the interest rate rule, but the results under the zero lower bound are completely
una⁄ected. The impact of a discount factor shock on output is smaller, because nominal and
real interest rates respond more to the shock. The government spending multiplier is also
reduced, because real interest rates rise by more in response to the shock. Interestingly, the
government spending shock is now de￿ ationary, because the fall in household consumption
causes a fall in real marginal costs. In addition, note that tax cuts become even less
expansionary in this case than in the baseline calibration.
Table 7 illustrates the case with decreasing returns to scale, setting ￿ = 0:3, approxi-
mately the measure of capital income share, with the alternative calibration for ￿. The
impact of shocks on output is altered signi￿cantly under both interest rate scenarios. Under
a Taylor rule, the impact of both discount factor shocks and ￿scal shocks on the output gap
is reduced. The reason is that, with decreasing returns to scale, the e⁄ect of the output
gap on in￿ ation is magni￿ed. This precipitates greater compensating responses of nominal
and real interest rates, reducing the real e⁄ects of shocks. Again, the government de￿cit
spending multiplier is less than unity, and the impact of tax cuts is only half that of the
baseline case.
By contrast, the introduction of decreasing returns dramatically magni￿es the e⁄ects
of government spending policies in the economy with a zero lower bound. The balanced
budget multiplier now increases to 1.9. The de￿cit spending multiplier is 3.6, and the tax
cut multiplier is 1.8. In this case, the ￿scal expansions have a larger e⁄ect on in￿ ation, as
marginal cost is more responsive to output movements. This leads to bigger negative e⁄ects
on real interest rates, generating a much bigger expansion in equilibrium output.
To some extent, the very large responses of real variables under the zero lower bound
is generated by the absence of capital in the model. It would be interesting to extend the
model to allow for endogenous capital accumulation. The results of Christiano et al. (2009)
however suggest that this would not alter the main message of the paper - there is likely
to be a very big di⁄erence between tax ￿nanced spending and debt ￿nanced spending in an
economy where the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero.
One assumption we have made is that all the accumulated debt during the zero lower
bound phase is immediately retired following a return to positive interest rates. This makes
the comparison of the two cases of positive and zero interest rates simple to present. What if
we make the alternative assumption; that the debt is retired gradually according to the rule
described by (29)? In that case, it turns out that the multiplier e⁄ects of debt are larger than
under the baseline case above. This is described in Table 8. While the balanced budget
multiplier is still unity, the de￿cit ￿nancing multiplier is over 3, and the tax cut multiplier is
29over 2. Because debt is expansionary, even in an economy with positive interest rates, the
expectation of higher debt in the future is even more expansionary. Note however, unlike
the previous case, where the impacts of ￿scal policy under the zero lower bound did not
depend at all on the parmeters of the interest rate rule, these e⁄ects will be in￿ uenced by
the rule. The more sensitive is the interest rate to the in￿ ation rate or the output gap in
the future, after the Taylor rule has been restored, the smaller will be the multiplier e⁄ects
of current debt ￿nanced government spending or tax cuts.
5.6 Monetary policy options
In the standard New Keynesian model discussed by Christiano et al. (2009), Woodford and
Eggerston (2003, 2005), Eggertson (2009), monetary policy has no direct leverage once the
economy is at the zero lower bound, since monetary policy is described completely by the
use of an interest rate rule. In this case, the only way monetary policy can be used in a
liquidity trap is by the announcement of an expansionary monetary policy to follow, after
the economy returns to positive nominal interest rates. These policies have been explored
extensively by Woodford and Eggerston (2003) and by Jung et al. (2005). In the current
model however, there is an additional lever of monetary policy, coming from a ￿ real balance￿
e⁄ect14. The monetary authority can print currency or increase bank reserves, and by doing
so increase the size of public sector liabilities. At the zero lower bound, this is equivalent
to issuing debt. Since the experiment we have looked at above consisted of issuing debt
to ￿nance tax cuts (or spending expansion) which is retired once the economy returns to
a positive nominal interest rate, it turns out that the impact of a debt ￿nanced tax cut
described above is in equivalent to to a policy of increasing the money base in order to
￿nance ￿scal transfers to the private sector, and then having this operation reversed once
the economy returns to a positive nominal interest rate. Thus, to the extent that de￿cit
￿nancing of tax cuts is an e⁄ective macroeconomic tool in dealing with a zero interest rate
environment, this is also true of a monetary policy expansion as described in this way15.
Quantitatively however, it is immediately obvious that the real balance e⁄ect cannot be
of signi￿cance in a⁄ecting real GDP. For instance, take a monetary policy operation which
directly increases M1, through increasing the money base. In the US, money base has more
than doubled in the last two years as a result of the emergency procedures put in place by
the Fed. But the total net wealth e⁄ects of this are negligible since even after the recent
14See Ireland (2005) for an analysis of this lever of monetary policy in an OLG model with ￿ exible prices.
15Note that this is not equivalent to an ￿ unconventional￿monetary policy whereby the Central Bank
purchases private sector obligations with government debt. Our model does not have enough heterogeneity
or the presence of risk premia to allow for a complete analysis of such an operation.
30operations, M1 and Money base represent very small fractions of total US private sector
net wealth. Thus, the impact of monetary operations via direct real balance e⁄ects alone
would be small fractions of the debt multipliers reported in Tables 4-8. As a result, while in
principle the model allows for a real balance e⁄ect of monetary policy, practically speaking,
even in a liquidity trap, increasing monetary aggregates alone would have very small e⁄ects,
as measured by the present model.
5.7 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the impact of government spending, tax cuts, and government
de￿cits in an economy where monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on
policy interest rates. We show that government spending ￿nanced by de￿cits may be
far more expansionary than that ￿nanced by tax increases in such a situation, even if the
di⁄erence between the two modes of ￿nancing is small during ￿ normal￿times, when the
policy rate is governed by a Taylor rule. From a di⁄erent perspective, the paper makes
the case that tax cuts alone may be highly expansionary in a liquidity trap, even if they
have almost no impact on aggregate demand during normal times. The results have some
substantial implications for the recent debate about the design of ￿scal stimulus programs
to respond to the 2008-2009 global ￿nancial crisis. It has been argued that successful
￿scal stimulus requires direct government spending rather than tax cuts. The results here
suggest that de￿cit ￿nanced tax cuts alone can be quite successful in targeting aggregate
demand. To the extent that a large part of the downturn in the real economy came from
a substantial increase in the savings rate, pushing the equilibrium real interest rate below
zero, the increase in government debt provided by tax cuts may be seen as directly providing
a vehicle for saving on the part of the private sector. This stems the de￿ ationary forces and
prevents the perverse response of real interest rates following the initial shock.
One important issue that has not been analyzed is the welfare consequences of ￿scal
policy. There are a number of subtle and di¢ cult features associated with welfare evaluation
in the present model. First, the model allows for dynamic ine¢ ciency, which in this context,
implies that the steady state net real interest rate may be negative. In that case, it is well
known that an increase in government debt can be Pareto improving. But this argument is
not relevant for the analysis of section 5, since the fall in real interest rates in our experiment
is a temporary phenomenon. Secondly, an analysis of welfare in the present model would
limited because the model does not incorporate capital accumulation. Hence, the standard
crowding out e⁄ects of government debt on the long run capital stock is absent in the
analysis. As shown in section 4 above, government debt has no impact on steady state
31output or consumption, but simply increases the steady state real interest rate, tilting the
time pro￿le of spending for each generation. Thus, it is likely that the ￿rst order e⁄ects of
government debt on steady state welfare would be missing from the analysis.
Nevertheless, there is still a possibility for increasing welfare through various ￿scal policy
instruments when the economy is in a liquidity trap. In particular, Christiano et al (2009)
show that in a liquidity trap, an increase in direct government spending above the ￿ exible
price optimum value of spending can increase welfare. Pursuing this analysis in our model
is more di¢ cult, because we do not have a natural social welfare function with which to
compare utilities across generations. Calvo and Obstfeld (1989) demonstrate that if a
government in the Blanchard Yaari economy has access to a full menu of redistributional
￿scal instruments, the social welfare function in the economy becomes equivalent to that
of the Cass-Koopmans neoclassical growth model. In that case, we can directly apply
the results of Christiano et al. (2009) to establish that government spending expansion
could increase welfare in our model, when the economy is in a liquidity trap. But in such
an environment (i.e. using the results of Calvo and Obstfeld 1989), there is no longer a
deviation from Ricardian equivalence, so the main focus of interest in the present paper
would be lost. Analysis of the impact of short run stabilization policy on welfare while
incorporating departures from Ricardian equivalence would require both a social welfare
function which takes into account intergenerational heterogeneity, as well as a means of
taking an approximation to this function along the lines of Eggertston and Woodford (2003).
Clearly the full exploration of short run welfare trade-o⁄s in the present model represents
an interesting research question. Nevertheless we defer such an analysis to future research.
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34Table 1 
2009 stimulus  Total Stimulus 
%(2008)GDP  Tax Cut  %(2008)GDP Tax Cut 
Argentina  1.3  0 1.3 0 
Australia  0.8  47.9 1.8 41.2 
Brazil  0.3  100 0.5 100 
Canada  1.5  40.4 2.8 45.4 
China  2.1  0 4.8 0 
France  0.7  6.5 0.7 6.5 
Germany  1.5  68 3.4 68 
India  0.5  0 0.5 0 
Indonesia  1.3  79 2.5 79 
Italy  0.2  0 0.3 0 
Japan  1.4  30 2.2 30 
Korea  1.4  17 2.7 17 
Mexico  1  0 1 0 
Russia  1.7  100 1.7 100 
Saudi Arabia  3.3  0 9.4 0 
South Africa  1.3  0 2.6 0 
Spain  1.1  36.7 4.5 36.7 
Turkey  0  N/A  0 N/A 
UK  1.4  73 1.5 73 















2007  2009  2010  2014 
Argentina ‐ 2.1 ‐ 3.9 ‐2.4 ‐1.7 
Australia  1.5 ‐ 4.3 ‐5.3 ‐1.1 
Brazil ‐ 2.8 ‐ 3.8 ‐1.2 ‐1 
Canada  1.6 ‐ 4.9 ‐4.1 0 
China  0.9 ‐ 3.9 ‐3.9 ‐0.8 
France ‐ 2.7 ‐ 8.3 ‐8.6 ‐5.2 
Germany ‐ .5 ‐ 4.2 ‐4.2 0 
India ‐ 1.2 ‐ 10.4 ‐10.0 ‐.8 
Indonesia ‐ 1.2 ‐ 2.6 ‐2.1 ‐1.3 
Italy ‐ 1.5 ‐ 5.6 ‐5.6 ‐5.3 
Japan ‐ 2.5 ‐ 10.5 ‐10.2 ‐8 
Korea  3.5 ‐ 2.8 ‐2.7 2.6 
Mexico ‐ 1.4 ‐ 4.9 ‐3.7 ‐3.1 
Russia  6.81 ‐ 3.6 ‐3.2 2.2 
Saudi Arabia  15.7  5 10 14.5 
South Africa  1.2 ‐ 4.4 ‐4.7 ‐2.5 
Turkey ‐ 2.1                ‐7.0 ‐ 4.3            ‐4.8 
UK ‐ 2.6 ‐ 11.6 ‐13.2 ‐6.8 













2007  2009  2010  2014 
Argentina  67.9  60.5 58.1 46.4 
Australia  9.8  16.9 22.7 27.8 
Brazil  66.8  68.5 65.9 58.8 
Canada  64.2  78.2 79.3 68.9 
China  20.2  20.2 22.2 20 
France  63.8  78 85.4 96.3 
Germany  63.4  78.7 84.5 89.3 
India  80.5  84.7 85.9 78.6 
Indonesia  35.1  35.1 31.2 27.1 
Italy  103.5  115.8 120.1 128.5 
Japan  187.7  218.6 227 245.6 
Korea  29.6  34.9 39.4 35.4 
Mexico  38.2  47.8 47.9 44.3 
Russia  7.4  7.2 7.7 7.2 
Saudi Arabia  18.5  14.5 12.5 9.3 
South Africa  28.5  48.1 49.6 52.8 
Turkey  39.4               48.1  49.6          52.8 
UK  44.1  68.7 81.7 98.3 
















  ˆ v  ˆ b   ˆ G   ˆ ˆ GT    ˆ T
ˆ Y   ‐3.2  0.04 1.07 1 ‐ .07
ˆ    ‐.05  0.01 0.07 0 ‐ .07
ˆ R   ‐.36  0.01 0.03 0 ‐ 0.03
Zero Lower Bound Model 
Shock 
ˆ Y   ‐13.8  0.05 2.01 1 ‐ 1.01
ˆ    ‐2.68  0.01 0.23 0 ‐ 0.23





  ˆ v  ˆ b   ˆ G   ˆ ˆ GT    ˆ T
ˆ Y   ‐1.75  0.02 .59 .56 ‐ .03
ˆ    ‐.3  0.01 ‐0.04 0 ‐ .035





  ˆ v  ˆ b   ˆ G   ˆ ˆ GT    ˆ T
ˆ Y   ‐3.0  0.032 0.94 0.89 ‐ 0.05
ˆ    ‐0.57  0.01 0.1 0.03 ‐ 0.07
ˆ R   ‐0.72  0.01 0.027 0 ‐ 0.027
Zero Lower Bound Model 
Shock 
ˆ Y   ‐21  0.06 3.62 1.86 ‐ 1.76
ˆ    ‐4.0  0.01 0.58 0.215 ‐ 0.36






  ˆ v  ˆ b   ˆ G   ˆ ˆ GT    ˆ T
ˆ Y   ‐13.7  0.12 3.72 1 ‐ 2.72
ˆ    ‐2.68  0.02 0.635 0 ‐ 0.635
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Figure 2